

Presidential Recruitment

Selection of Presidential Candidates in Africa, Asia, and Latin America

Camilla Gjerde

Centre for the Study of Civil War (CSCW)

International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO)

camilla@prio.no

Abstract

This article explores the selection of presidential candidates in relation to the degree of openness and inclusiveness of candidacy and selectorates in Latin America, Africa and Asia. How candidates are selected is expected to affect their legitimacy as candidates: candidates nominated in systems with little restrictions on candidacy and candidates selected in open competition with other candidates were hypothesised to be more representative and legitimate than others. The analysis of data from Latin America, Africa and Asia reveals that presidential candidate selection has become more inclusive during the past thirty years in all three regions under study. The article attempts to identify the main reasons why 'democratisation' of presidential candidate selection is a trend in Third Wave democracies and concludes that an institutionalised party system, a ban on presidential re-election and regional factors, are among the most important variables in explaining methods of candidate selection.

Draft version.

Paper prepared for presentation at the National Conference in Political Science in Bergen, January 4-6, 2005

Introduction

There are two separate phases in the recruitment of politicians: the *selection* and the *election* of candidates (Norris 1996). This article is about the first step in the presidential recruitment process: the selection of presidential candidates. It argues that the way candidates are selected affects party politics, democracy and legitimacy in important ways and explores the determinants of presidential candidate selection in new democracies.

The selection of candidates is assumed to determine the quality of the candidates elected and how these candidates behave in office (De Luca et al. 2002: 413-4; Gallagher 1988a: 1). Furthermore, candidate selection is argued to relate to democracy. It is assumed that open, inclusive selection procedures are more democratic than more closed selection methods (Hazan 2002; Rahat and Hazan 2001), and therefore normatively preferable (Bille 2001). How candidates are selected is taken as a sign of internal party democracy (Gallagher 1988a: 1) and even of how democratic the regime is (Bille 2001: 364). Bille claims that a regime cannot be considered democratic if the parties lack mechanisms for inclusiveness and participation.¹ Candidate selection is also hypothesized to affect candidates' legitimacy and perceived representativeness. If open selection processes are regarded as more democratic by voters, then candidates selected in competitive races at the ballot can claim a more legitimate mandate than those selected by the party elite in smoked back rooms (Carey and Polga-Hecimovich 2004). This 'stamp of legitimacy' may be an asset to them in the general election and contribute to their winning.

Despite the importance attributed to selection methods, Gallagher and Marsh's (1988) description of candidate selection processes as 'the secret garden of politics' is still an accurate picture of presidential candidate selection in new democracies. Most that is written concerns selection of legislative candidates, not of presidential wannabes. It is therefore difficult to find general and comparative theoretical assumptions on the determinants of *presidential* selection methods. Still more difficult is it to find data on how presidential candidates are selected. There are a few recent studies on presidential candidate selection in Latin America (Carey and Polga-Hecimovich 2004; Freidenberg and Sánchez López 2002; Payne et al. 2002), but none exist for African or Asian presidential selection. None of these studies have focused on the determinants of presidential candidate selection and none of them have studied presidential candidate selection cross-regionally. In the first part of this article I attempt to fill this gap by presenting and analysing an original dataset on selection of winners and runner-ups in presidential elections in Africa, Asia and Latin America from 1974 through 2004.

¹ These are matters that will not be discussed here, but are analysed in depth in Gjerde (2005).

Epstein (1967: 201-3) and Ranney (1981: 75) underline that ‘nomination’ and ‘candidate selection’ refer to two distinct processes, though often used interchangeably. Nomination denotes the ‘legal procedure by which election authorities certify a person as a qualified candidate for an elective public office and print his or her name on the election ballot for that office.’ (Ranney 1981: 75). Candidate selection, on the other hand, is the ‘predominantly *extralegal* process by which a political party decides which of the persons legally eligible to hold an elective office will be designated on the ballot and in election communications as its recommended and supported candidate.’ (Op.cit.) It is worth noting that though candidate selection is *predominantly* an extralegal process, selection procedures may be stipulated in legal sources. In the U.S., candidate selection has been closely regulated in state law since 1974 (Ranney 1981: 76). Similarly, during the past decade, many Latin American countries have specified their presidential selection procedures in the constitution or in election or party law, so that these are not any longer a matter for the parties to decide.²

This article is focuses on methods of candidate selection and their determinants. I first classify selection methods according to their varying degree of inclusiveness. Secondly, I describe the cases and the data I have collected and comment on the popularity of different selection methods over time and across regions. Thirdly, I discuss why there is a tendency towards more inclusive candidate selection over time and test these hypotheses on data from Africa, Asia and Latin America. Finally, I summarise my findings.

Presidential Candidate Selection

Selection processes can be thought of as a continuum based on the level of inclusiveness or exclusiveness (Rahat and Hazan 2001; Rahat 2002: 110-111). Candidate selection is in this respect linked to democratisation. Inclusiveness is argued to be a necessary condition for ‘democratisation’ of candidate selection methods (Rahat 2002: 117). The more inclusive the candidate selection, the more open, transparent and democratic the selection process is perceived to be.

Methods of Candidate Selection

Candidate selection method refers to the way candidates are selected and the degree of inclusiveness and party control in the process. Most scholars differentiate between selection procedures depending on how restrictive ballot access is, in other words, how inclusive or exclusive the selectorate is (De Luca et al 1999; Payne et al 2002; Rahat and Hazan 2001) or

² The constitutions of Uruguay (1996) and Venezuela (1999) stipulate that presidential candidates shall be selected in primaries, while electoral laws or party laws regulate the use of primaries in Bolivia, Colombia (only if primaries are held), Costa Rica, Honduras, Panama, and Paraguay (Payne et al 2002:159).

the degree of openness of the selection process (Carey and Shugart 1995; Shugart 2001). How restricted is the selecting agency? Do party insiders control the candidacy of presidential hopefuls or is it the voters who make up the selectorate?

At least three main categories of candidate selection can be differentiated on this basis, from the most exclusive to the most inclusive: Selection by (1) Party elite (2) Party conventions, or (3) Primaries. Shugart (2001) adds a fourth category: Candidacies based on signature collection or deposit, what I would call self-selection. We will see that self-selection should be considered a sub-category of selection by a party elite, rather than a proper selection method.

Based on how inclusive the selectorate is, the categories above can be placed on an ‘inclusiveness–exclusiveness’ continuum of candidate selection (Rahat and Hazan 2001). The degree of inclusiveness in candidate selection is perceived as an indication of the degree of ‘democratisation’ (Rahat and Hazan 2001). The more inclusive the selection method, the more ‘democratic’ the selectorate is perceived to be, and the more representative and legitimate mandate the candidate can claim to have.



Figure 1: Inclusiveness of candidate selection (Source: Rahat and Hazan 2001)

Party elite

The least inclusive way of selecting candidates is through elite arrangements. Elite arrangements include a variety of different methods, ranging from imposition of a candidate by the party leader or the incumbent president to candidate nomination emerging out of a negotiation among party elites or founding of parties to support a presidential candidacy. If the party leader or the party leadership presents only one candidate for a party convention and there is no real competition for the candidacy, the nomination must also be considered an elite arrangement (De Luca et al. 2002: 419).

In many parties where party convention is the official selection mechanism for presidential candidates, the party leader is perceived as ‘the owner’ of the presidential nomination if he

does not explicitly reject it. There is therefore no opposition to their candidacy and the selection of candidates must be considered as an elite arrangement. This is typically the dominating pattern in recently founded parties, parties that are often extremely personalistic and individualistic. In these *caudillo* parties, party leaders and incumbent presidents who are banned from re-election tend to handpick a crown prince as presidential candidate. Recent examples from sub-Saharan Africa are Rawlings's selection of Atta Mills in Ghana 2000, Frederick Chiluba's selection of Levy Mwanawasa in Zambia 2001, and Daniel Arap Moi's selection of Uhuru Kenyatta in Kenya 2002.

Party conventions

A less restrictive and more transparent way of selecting presidential candidates is through party conventions. Presidential nomination at party conventions is the product of a formal party assembly where the delegates choose among competing candidates. However, participation is still rather restricted since only a selection of party members may participate at the party assembly. The number of delegates may vary between a few hundred to several thousand.

In Africa, party conventions are on paper the most widely used method for selecting presidential candidates. Often, however, it is only a rubber stamp mechanism to legitimise a decision already taken by some higher party organ or the party leader personally. To get a picture of where the real decision over presidential nomination lies, candidates who run unopposed at party conventions are classified as elite settlements.

Primaries

In primaries, selection of candidates for public office is open for all members of the party or the whole electorate. Often, primaries are treated as a single category (De Luca et al. 2002; Shugart 2001; Carey and Polga-Hecimovich 2004). Such a classification is too crude. Primaries differ in degree of openness, and this variation is assumed to have consequences for the type of candidates selected (Canon 1990; Gerber and Morton 1998). Primaries may either be *open* for all registered voters; or *semi-closed*, meaning that only members of the party that holds the primary and independent or new voters are allowed to participate; or they may be *closed* for all other than party members. In the following, only open and closed primaries will be referred to as no party in my dataset has employed semi-closed primaries when selecting presidential candidates.

Primaries are often argued to be a threat against party unity and encourage party division, and disrupt the internal harmony or the unified external image of the party. They are also argued to lead to election of weak candidates (Colomer 2003). On the other hand, primaries are said to strengthen the elected president's legitimacy both within his own party and among the

electorate (Payne et al 2002: 157). The quality of internal democracy is assumed to be improved by maximising transparency and participation in the nomination process (Hazan 2002). On the other hand, it is widely held that open primaries weaken party cohesiveness and undermine the loyalty of candidates to party policies because they invoke a direct relationship between candidates and voters and reduce the role of parties in the nomination process (Pennings and Hazan 2001: 271). The more open the nomination process, the less the party controls the behaviour of its representatives. Open primaries are generally believed to create opportunities for people outside the traditional arenas for elective office (LeDuc 2001: 326) A candidate does not necessarily need support from the party to run as a candidate in primaries. The depth of support in the party does not matter unless the party leadership controls who can run in the primaries.

Self selection

According to Shugart (2001), the least restrictive way of gaining presidential candidacy is by creating one's own party or stand as an independent candidate. In these systems it is easy for dissenting politicians or politicians who do not reach the top in one of the established parties to establish a new party or run as an independent. Politicians establishing their own party vehicle ahead of presidential elections or racing as independents are here considered the least restrictive way of candidate selection. On the other hand, I would argue that self-nomination through the creation of your own party is a highly closed process in an open party system. It is the decision of very few people (often just one) and can therefore be compared to nomination by a party leader or the party leadership, executive committee etc. Self-nomination is generally a viable option for ambitious politicians in un-institutionalised party systems or in party systems in flux. It is therefore particularly a pattern found in countries with highly personalistic politics, countries with little democratic experience and weak party institutionalisation. At most, self-selection requires a fairly restricted amount of signatures from the electorate and payment of a deposit. It is particularly a strategy chosen by politicians who are unsuccessful in obtaining a nomination from more established parties. I will therefore consider self-selection to be a sub-category of elite arrangement.

There is a number of recent examples of self-selection, especially in weakly institutionalised party systems, but even in more institutionalised settings. Only in the year 2002 former coup maker Lucio Gutiérrez chose to race as presidential candidate in Ecuador, as did the coca farmer Evo Morales in Bolivia and general Amadou Toumani Touré in Mali. Even Costa Rica with its institutionalised party system saw a self-selected presidential candidate that year with the surprise candidacy of former liberal politician Ottón Solís.

Empirical Patterns of Candidate Selection Methods

The discussion above leaves us with four main methods of candidate selection from the most exclusive to the most inclusive: Selection by 1) Party leadership (and self-selection) 2) Party delegates 3) Closed primaries 4) Open primaries. I have so far only given a few snapshots of the use of methods for presidential candidate selection in the three regions included in this study. In this section I present an original dataset of selection methods for presidential candidates in 164 elections that will allow for comparative and systematic study of the inclusiveness of presidential candidate selection. Before turning to the patterns and trends over time and across regions, I will present the sample population. First however, the relationship between rules and practice when collecting data on presidential selection methods requires a comment.

Rules vs. Practice

Gallagher (1988: 5) considers that ‘any study of candidate selection must go far beyond, while not ignoring, examination of what party constitutions say about it.’ In my case, it is inevitable to go beyond formal rules and look at practice, since selection methods are rarely formalised in presidential systems in Africa and Asia. In most cases in Africa and Asia, there is no mention of how presidential candidates should be selected, neither in the constitution, electoral law or party constitution. In contrast, in quite a few Latin American countries, the rules for selection of presidential candidates have been formalised and included in the constitution or electoral or party laws during the past decades. This is the case in Uruguay, Venezuela, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Honduras, Panama, and Paraguay (Payne et al. 2002: 159). All of these countries have specified that presidential candidates should be selected by some kind of primary elections. This, however, is a new and so far, regional trend.

More importantly, rules are not always followed. Before the 2000 elections in Venezuela, none of the presidential candidates were selected in primaries as the constitution of 1999 required. Therefore, if the selection procedure has any effect on which type of candidate is selected, it is essential to look at practice, not only rules. Other examples similarly suggest that rules do not necessarily equal practice. Even if primaries are established as the only legal way to select candidates in a country, the party leadership or party convention may agree to name only one candidate who then runs unopposed in the party’s open primaries, thereby effectively making the party leadership or the party delegates the real selectorate, not the voters. This happened in the centre-left coalition Encuentro Progresista-Frente Amplio (EP-FA) of Uruguay where the FA national convention had decided to have only one candidate in the 2004 party primaries, the popular candidate Tabaré Vázquez, who consequently ran unopposed in the 2004 primaries – and ultimately won the presidency.

Before the elections in Paraguay 1993, the candidate of the governing Colorado party was to be selected in a closed primary. The result of the primary gave Luis María Argaña, the leader of the traditionalist faction of the Colorados, a narrow victory. However, the result was not what the leader of the opposing faction, General Oviedo, wanted. With the support of party officials, he managed to get Juan Carlos Wasmosy, from his own faction, selected as the official Colorado candidate (Abente-Brun 1999: 94).

In Namibia's ruling Swapo party, the statutes state that the presidential candidate shall be selected by an extraordinary party congress. However, it is well known that until 2004, the nomination 'belonged' to the party leader, Sam Nujoma, with no open competition for the presidential candidacy at the extraordinary party conventions. The selection method used to nominate Nujoma in 1994 and 1999 should consequently be considered as elite arrangements. This changed in 2004, when Nujoma decided to step down as president after the fulfilment of three presidential terms (of which he was directly elected in two). The competition for the SWAPO presidential nomination 2004 was for the first time decided by party delegates and not effectively in a backroom. Three candidates competed for the SWAPO presidential nomination at the extraordinary party convention in May. Even if Nujoma's preferred candidate, Hifikepunye Pohamba, eventually won the SWAPO presidential candidacy (and the presidency) in a runoff, the selection was effectively the party delegates' and not the party leader's.³ It was not given that Pohamba would get support from a majority of delegates despite Nujoma's support (Sherbourne 2004).

In sum, to study selection methods, whether formalised or not, one must look at practice. I have therefore collected data on how presidential candidates were effectively selected in each case – regardless of rules.

The sample population: Competitive Presidential Systems

When deciding which cases to include when testing theories, it is essential to decide the domain of the argument (Geddes 2003). This article focuses on theories of how presidents are selected which are general in scope and concern democratic presidential systems. There are consequently at least three things to decide when selecting cases for this study: 1) what constitutes a presidential democracy? 2) the geographical scope of the argument 3) the time period.

'*Presidential democracy*'. A presidential system can be defined as a political system in which the chief executive is elected directly and independently of the assembly.

³ Pohamba received 213 (41%) of 516 votes in the first round, and in the runoff against the former minister Hamutenya obtained 341 (66.5%) against Hamutenya's 167 votes (Sherbourne 2004:2).

A frequent point of departure for selection of cases when studying presidential institutions is that systems should be at least minimally democratic. I will consider regimes democratic if ‘some governmental offices are filled by contested elections.’ (Przeworski et al 2000:35) I follow Przeworski and colleagues’ (2000:18-30) three coding rules for ‘democracies’ when deciding which cases to include in my dataset: 1) The president must be elected in direct elections 2) The legislature must be elected 3) There must be more than one party. Multiparty elections must have been held at least twice, consecutively, to allow for inclusion in the sample.⁴ I include even presidential systems in which a single party has been in power to date. Consequently, systems where democratic rules are accepted and respected will be studied, but also cases in which multiparty elections are held but where the rule of law is not always respected. These comprise cases of stalled transitions and imperfect competition for office, but that nevertheless have held at least two consecutive multiparty elections, such as Zimbabwe or Gabon. In other words, my sample is biased in favour of ‘democracies’ and includes ‘hybrid’ regimes, ‘semi-democracies’, ‘illiberal democracies’, or what Levitsky and Way (2002) call ‘competitive authoritarian’ regimes.⁵ However, systems that were classified as Not Free by Freedom House for the whole period of multiparty elections have been excluded from the sample.

Geographical scope. Since the theories that will be discussed and tested throughout this study are general, any presidential system that has introduced competitive elections falls under the domain of the argument. Therefore, it would be preferable to study all systems with directly elected president. However, since there are no studies on presidential selection in new democracies, obtaining data on selection of presidential candidates is an arduous task. Limited resources have therefore made me restrict the sample to presidential systems in Latin America

⁴ In addition, Przeworski et al. propose a fourth rule: *alternation* in power. If the first three conditions are fulfilled, but there has only been one party in power for more than two terms from a point in the past until date or until they were overthrown, Przeworski et al. exclude these from their dataset of ‘democracies’. There is no way of knowing whether incumbents accept elections only because they know they will win, or whether they would in fact accept electoral defeat. Consequently, they choose a ‘cautious stance’ and consider regimes democratic for their whole tenure in office only if the incumbent party at some point in time lose elections. If the alternation rule is accepted, Namibia, Mozambique, and Paraguay for instance are not classified as democracies, since there has not yet been more than one party in power. There is an element of arbitrariness in the alternation rule. Whether or not a regime is considered democratic depends to a certain degree on *when* the selection is done. Przeworski et al. (2000:28) acknowledge the option of ignoring the alternation rule when selecting cases. Doing that, however, makes the selection biased in favour of democracies. The question of using the alternation rule or not is a matter of deciding which way to err: whether it is preferable to err by excluding from the democracies some systems that are in fact democracies, or to err by including as democracies some systems that are not in fact democratic: ‘Err we must; the question is which way.’ (Przeworski et al. 2000:23) I choose to err in the opposite direction of Przeworski et al. by including even presidential systems in which a single party has been in power to date.

⁵ This is done for several reasons. First, democratisation is not a linear and non-reversible process as testified by Fujimori’s Peru and Chávez’s Venezuela. Democratic institutions are to some degree feeble, especially where they have not been in effect for long. Second, since this article is an attempt to study presidential selection in new democracies and to test whether and how institutions and actors matter for democracy, democratic backlashes should not be avoided, but studied.

and the Caribbean, sub-Saharan Africa and Asia-Pacific⁶ in order to fulfil my aim. The post-communist Central Asian, European and Eurasian presidential systems are therefore excluded from this study, as well as countries with less than 1 million inhabitants.

Time period. The time period under study is ‘the third wave of democratisation’ (Huntington 1990). The starting point of the ‘third wave’ is set to 1974, with the Portuguese transition from authoritarianism to democracy and that spread throughout Southern Europe and Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s and through Eastern Europe, Africa and Asia from the late 1980s and the 1990s. The end point of the period under study is set to end 2004. The third wave is chosen for several reasons. First, it was with the surge of the third wave of democratisation that the institutionalist theories on the impact of regime choice, institutional design and presidential leadership for democratic stability were formulated. Second, the spread of competitive presidentialism to Latin America, Africa and Asia makes it the first time that a cross-regional analysis of presidential systems is possible and the theories on presidential institutions can be tested on a wide range of cases.

In summary, the sample population contains all presidential systems in Latin America, Africa and Asia-Pacific that held at least two consecutive multicandidate presidential and parliamentary elections between 1974 and 2004. The number of elections varies from two in a few African countries, to a maximum of eight in several Latin American countries. The only two countries in my dataset that held competitive elections before the ‘Third Wave of democratisation’, Costa Rica and Venezuela, are included with elections from 1974.

Data, Patterns and Trends

In contrast to the reliable documentation of presidential election methods, there is no existing dataset on selection methods worldwide. One of the reasons is of course that while election methods are relatively stable and always established in legal sources, selection methods tend to be much more unstable and may vary from one party to another within a country and from one election to the next. Another problem is that some authors do not differ between open and closed primaries, or that sources differ in their classification criteria. Sources for every election and every candidate must therefore be consulted to discover the patterns of selection methods. Building on Freidenberg and Sánchez López (2002), Payne et al. (2002), and Carey and Polga-Hecimovich’s (2004) list of selection methods in Latin America, I was able to relatively easily collect data on presidential selection in Latin America. For elections in Latin America where data was not readily available and for data on selection of African and Asian presidential candidates, I searched the secondary literature on elections and party systems,

⁶ Presidential systems in East, South and Southeast Asia are included. These countries will in the following be referred to as ‘Asian’.

government and non-government websites, and news reports from the first multiparty elections held, though from 1974 at the earliest. All together, the dataset includes selection of winners and runner-ups in 164 presidential elections from 1974 through 2004, covering a total of 325 candidates.⁷

In general we should expect parties to select their presidential candidates in smoke-filled back rooms rather than at the ballot box. The reason is the nature of presidential elections. The nature of elections is generally held to be an important determinant for how parliamentary candidates are selected, whether elected from national or local lists (Gallagher 1988a: 9). If candidates are elected from national lists rather than local, the selection process is expected to be centralised. Since presidential elections are always a national matter and each party may only present one nationwide list, presidential candidate selection should be exclusive rather than inclusive. An additional electoral system hypothesis that leads us to expect presidential candidate selection to be a highly exclusive process, says that ‘the smaller the role of the voter in deciding which candidates are elected, the greater the power of the parties’ national agencies.’ (Gallagher 1988a: 10) Given the majoritarian winner-take-all character of presidential elections the individual voter generally has very little influence over the final result presidential candidate selection should be closed processes.

Figure 2 confirms that presidential candidate selection is indeed a matter for the party elite. 77% of the winners of the presidential contests and 80% of the runner-ups have been selected either by the party leadership or by party delegates, of which the majority of the top two candidates were selected by the party leader(ship). There are nevertheless candidates that are selected at the ballot box rather than in smoked back rooms. In total, around 20% of the top two candidates were elected as candidates in primaries. Open primaries have been somewhat less frequent than closed primaries, further illustrating the tendency that the more inclusive the procedure, the less popular it has been for presidential candidate selection.

⁷ The odd number is due to three missing values.

Figure 2: Selection of presidential candidates in Africa, Asia and Latin America 1974-2004 (N=325)




Figure 3: Candidate selection of the top two presidential contenders. (N=325)





Figure 4: Methods of candidate selection and trends over time



From figures 3 and 4 we see that the tendency for parties to select presidential candidates in backrooms is clearly more common in Africa and Asia than in Latin America. Party conventions used to be the dominant pattern of presidential candidate selection in Latin America before the recent opening of nomination procedures (figure 4). Selection of presidential candidates by the party elite and party delegates has gradually lost popularity in Latin America as demands for greater intra-party transparency and participation in the nomination processes have gained ground (Freidenberg and Sánchez López 2002; Payne et al. 2002: 155-6). In Africa and Asia, it is still one of the main mechanisms for selecting presidential candidates, although there is an increasing inclusiveness in selection of presidential candidates even here.

The first primaries to be held in my dataset were in 1978 in Colombia, Costa Rica, and Venezuela (Carey and Polga-Hecimovich 2004). While only three countries had held primaries – once – by 1980, there are only three Latin American countries in which no presidential candidate has been selected through primaries by 2004: Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru.⁸ Figure 3.4 illustrates that between 1984 through 1993 – when the majority of the Latin American countries introduced multiparty elections – primaries became the most frequently used method of presidential candidate selection. 44% of the presidential winners were selected in primaries, and the majority of these in open primaries.

In contrast, the vast majority of parties in Africa and Asia have selected their winning candidates in elite arrangements during all three periods (figure 4). But even here there is a tendency towards somewhat more inclusive selection processes over time, although primaries have not gained ground in Africa. There is only one African party that has once held primaries to select its presidential candidate: The runner-up Cissé of ADEMA was selected in closed primaries in Mali 2002. In Asia, both South Korea and Taiwan have used primaries as a way to select presidential candidates.

South Korea has so far only used primaries once, prior to the presidential elections in 2003. The two main parties, the Millennium Democratic Party (MDP) of incumbent president Kim and the opposition Grand National Party (GNP), used a combination of closed and more open primaries. All party members were allowed to vote, while a group of randomly selected independent voters were selected to participate in the party primaries.

⁸ Payne and colleagues (2002:165) name four countries that have never held primaries to select presidential candidates: Brazil, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Peru. Carey and Polga-Hecimovich (2004) in addition has Bolivia on that list. Both Brazil and Guatemala held primaries before the last presidential elections in 2002 and 2003 respectively. Lula da Silva in Brazil was selected in closed primaries, while the winner of the Guatemalan elections, Oscar Berger, initially won the PAN primaries. These results were nevertheless overridden by the PAN party leadership, and Berger defected to a newly established coalition, GANA, to become their high profile presidential candidate through an elite agreement. While Bolivia according to Payne et al introduced legislation

However, there is no linear, irreversible development towards greater inclusiveness. Note that the proportion of candidates selected by the party leadership is bigger in the most recent period, 1994-2004, than it was in the previous period. There are three primary reasons for this 'backlash'. First, in many or even most cases, parties use more inclusive methods of candidate selection at one point and then revert to more exclusive methods of selection in subsequent elections. Second, the backlash may also be due to the growing amount of independent, self-selected outsider candidates during the last decade in Latin America. Lastly, the introduction of multiparty presidential elections in Africa and Asia has increased the proportion of elite settlements because the post of secretary general is typically a guarantee for becoming the party's presidential candidate in most of Asia and Africa.

The experience with primaries in Taiwan exemplifies that there is not necessarily a linear development from more closed to more open selection methods. Furthermore, it demonstrates that although parties in the same country may open their selection process in response to developments in competing parties, the choice of selection method is often a response to intra-party rather than inter-party pressure. In 1995, Taiwan's Democratic Progressive Party, the DPP, used a two-step primary system in 1995 to nominate its presidential candidate, Chen Shui-bian, a combination of closed and open primaries, each given a weight of 50%. The DPP candidate lost to the incumbent president of the Kuomintang (KMT), Lee, who was selected at a party convention. Before the following presidential elections in 2000, Chen Shui-bian was selected unopposed at a party convention – and won. The presidential candidate of the former single-party KMT, Lien Chang, won the closed KMT party primaries in competition with James Soong (Wu 2001). Soong responded by leaving the KMT and running as an independent, self-selected candidate. Soong ended as number two, beating the winner of the KMT primaries, but losing to the DPP's Chen Shui-bian. The selection of presidential candidates before the 2004 elections was a matter of elite arrangements in both the ruling DPP and the KMT, when the KMT struck a deal with the dark horse in the 2000 elections, James Soong, by making him its vice-presidential candidate.

Given the national character and great importance of presidential elections, why is there a tendency towards more inclusive candidate selection over time? Why does any party choose to delegate the selection of one of their most important decisions, the selection of a presidential candidate, to the voters? Why is presidential candidate selection more inclusive in Latin America than in Africa and Asia? In other words, what contributes to 'democratisation' of presidential candidate selection?

to regulate presidential candidate selection through primaries in 1999, none of the candidates in the 2003 race were selected in primaries.

Explaining presidential candidate selection

Recently there has been a surge in the literature on parliamentary candidate selection methods, their determinants and their consequences (Canon 1990; Carey and Shugart 1995; Gerber and Morton 1998; Katz 2001; Lundell 2004; Norris 1996; Pennings and Hazan 2001; Rahat and Hazan 2001; Öhman 2004). But except for presidential selection in the United States, scant attention has been given to *presidential* selection procedures. To my knowledge there exists no comparative study of what affects presidential candidate selection.

Consequently, most of the theoretical contributions on the determinants of candidate selection deal with selection of assembly candidates and not presidential candidates. Because of the lack of general hypotheses on determinants of presidential candidate selection, I will assume that the factors argued to influence selection of legislative candidates are applicable to presidential candidate selection as well. This is done even if Ranney (1981: 97) claims that the differences between selecting presidential candidates and legislative candidates are great. He argues that presidential candidate selection is

generally much more fluid, changing, and ad hoc than is the selection of parliamentary candidates. [...] Party organisations are less important, and candidate-centered organizations are much more important. (Ranney 1981: 97)

Ranney's point further underlines what is already said about presidential selection: it tends to be closed rather than open. His point does not lead us anywhere nearer an understanding of the trend towards more inclusiveness in presidential candidate selection, nor why it varies so much between regions.

Determinants of candidate selection

The most thorough discussion of determinants of candidate selection is found in Gallagher and Marsh (1988). Gallagher (1988a, 1988b) examines five factors commonly assumed to influence the degree of inclusiveness in parliamentary candidate selection: legal provisions, governmental organisation, electoral system, political culture, and the nature of the party. We have already seen that the nature of the electoral system as understood here is invariant in presidential systems and cannot explain variation between countries and parties' for selecting presidential candidates. That leaves us with four potential determinants of presidential candidate selection. The first three factors, legal provisions, government structure, and political culture, are country specific and may explain the variation in candidate selection between countries and why there is a tendency for parties within the same country to use the same methods for selecting candidates. They cannot, however, explain why candidate selection processes vary between parties in the same country. The latter aspect, the nature of

the party, may provide explanations for within-country variation. In addition to these four aspects, I will discuss the importance of the nature of the party system and of incumbency for candidate selection.

We have already seen that *legal provisions* governing candidate selection processes are not common, and where they exist, they are not always followed. Where they exist, legal prescriptions nevertheless tend to affect the choice of candidate selection methods: 'Legal provisions affect political culture as well as being affected by it. Once a law exists, the process it prescribes may come to acquire a certain legitimacy'. (Gallagher 1988b: 257) That a law makes certain selection processes more legitimate than others in the eyes of the electorate makes it more difficult for parties to choose another way of selecting its candidates than the ones prescribed by law, even if the law is not binding. Parties choosing a more centralised process of candidate selection than prescribed by law may be regarded as undemocratic and the voters might punish these parties at the ballot box. This holds only insofar as some or most of the other parties select their candidates as the law prescribes. If no party follow the law, as in Venezuela 2000, none of the parties will be judged as more centralised and less 'democratic' than others, but voters might lose confidence in the political process and the political actors. Nonetheless, the introduction of legal provisions regulating presidential candidate selection in many countries in Latin America during the last decade has no doubt contributed to the Latin American trend towards more inclusive methods of candidate selection. Unfortunately, there is not enough reliable information if and when legal provisions have been introduced to include this variable in an analysis. The explanatory power of legal provisions is nevertheless weak. The question remains why some countries choose to introduce laws regarding selection processes while others do not.

Second, whether a country is federal or unitary is argued to affect candidate selection. Candidate selection mirrors the *governmental structure*, Epstein (1980) and Lawson (1967) claim. If countries are federal, the decentralised decision structure spills over on how candidates are selected. Federal states are therefore expected to use more inclusive methods for selecting candidates than unitary states. Gallagher finds that there is indeed a relationship between the level of government centralisation and exclusiveness of candidate selection. Parties in federal countries tend to select their candidates with more inclusive selectorates than unitary states. The effect of government structure on selection processes may have more relevance for selection of parliamentary candidates than selection of presidential candidates because the latter is always a national matter and will always be of utmost importance for the party at central level. Only in Latin America there is considerable variation on this variable in my dataset. Here, there are several examples that the difference between unitary and federal states does not seem to affect presidential candidate selection. The first country in Latin America to establish a norm for using primaries when selecting presidential candidates is the

small, unitary state Costa Rica. Federal Venezuela has almost as long history of democratic elections as Costa Rica, and Venezuela has used presidential primaries only occasionally. The government structure is measured as a federal-unitary dummy with federal states given a score of 1 and unitary states coded 0.

A change in *political culture* might account for the gradual use of more inclusive selection methods. Such an explanation posits a link between the institutionalisation of democracy in a country and the ‘democratisation’ of selection processes. As democratic norms and procedures become institutionalised and democracy ‘the only game in town’, there will be a pressure from voters and party members towards more inclusiveness and openness in one of the most important decisions a party makes: the selection of a presidential candidate. Conversely, in countries with recent authoritarian experience, centralised and exclusive selection processes will be chosen as a matter of experience. In a comparative study of legislative candidate selection, Lundell (2004) suggests that the degree of inclusiveness may have to do authoritarian traditions. Countries with experience of undemocratic rule apply more centralised rules than countries without (recent) authoritarian experience, he contends. In support of this hypothesis, there are no countries in Latin America, Africa, or Asia in which presidential candidates have been selected in primaries in the first elections after introducing competitive elections. Democratic tradition and culture will be measured in two ways: *the number of years since transition* and the *Freedom House score*. The Freedom House index ranges from the most free countries that score 1 to the least free with a score of 7. The Freedom House country score for the election year is used as an indication of the level of democracy. If democratic culture leads to more inclusive selection, Freedom House should have a negative effect on inclusiveness of presidential candidate selection. If countries with recent authoritarian experience tend to select their presidential candidates with more closed methods than countries with many years experience from democratic politics, years of transition should have a positive effect on candidate selection.

Political culture can be seen as an important factor affecting candidate selection. Gallagher (1988b: 261) claims that parties are heavily influenced by what other parties do. If one of the bigger parties chooses a more inclusive selection method, other parties might feel pressured to follow. They might fear being regarded by voters as less democratic and their candidate as having a less legitimate mandate than the candidate selected in a more inclusive process. In fear of losing the election, they too might choose to select their candidate in a more open way. Since more inclusive candidate selection processes are generally regarded as more democratic, a process towards more inclusiveness might also be sparked from strategic, rather than genuine democratic, reasons. A party may introduce more open methods of candidate selection to get a moral advantage over other parties, still selecting their candidates in the executive committee or by the party leader. Opening up selection processes might also be a

strategic move from parties struggling with an authoritarian past. In an attempt to boost their democratic legitimacy, they may adopt a more open selection procedure, thereby creating a domino effect among the other parties that do not want to appear less democratic than their opponents.

Such a contagion effect from one party to another can partly explain the fact that the correlation between selection of winners and runner-ups in my dataset is 0.60. This appears to confirm Gallagher's assumption that there is a spill over between parties with regards to candidate selection. The bivariate correlation indicates that, yes, there is probably contagion from one party to another. It also tells us that presidential candidate selection relatively varies between parties. Parties neither operate in total isolation from each other nor do they completely conform to other parties' decisions on how to select their candidates. This is confirmed in a study from De Luca and colleagues (2002). In their analysis of candidate selection in provinces in Argentina, they tested whether contagion from other regions affects a party's decision to hold a primary or not. They found that it does not, suggesting that the choice of selection method is driven more by intraparty politics than by external pressure.

Imitation may also occur within a region. The tendency towards more inclusive selection of presidential candidates over time, especially for Latin American countries, may be attributed to regional contagion. If inclusive selection methods are viewed as a device that boosts support among the electorate and that contributes to portray the party as transparent and democratic, then a party should be affected by the experiences of more inclusive selection processes in neighbouring countries. Two dummies are created to measure regional contagion effects and to hold constant some of the possible cultural effects that cannot be measured directly: *Africa* where all African countries are coded 1, all others 0 and *Asia* where all Asian candidates are coded 1, otherwise 0. Latin America is the left-out category.

The *nature of the party* is hypothesised to affect the way candidates are selected (Gallagher 1988b: 263; Hazan 2002; Lundell 2004; Rahat and Hazan 2001). The nature of parties is a wide concept, ranging from the ideological profile of a party to the age and size of a party. There are at least three different views on the relationship between candidate selection and party system. Since selection of candidates is a party matter, the characteristics of the party and the party system may be what really affect how candidates are chosen. Gallagher (1988b: 277) represents such a view, saying that 'the nature of the nominating procedure reflects the nature of the party more than it determines it'. Schattschneider (1942: 64), on the other hand, argued that the nature of candidate selection determines the nature of the party rather than the other way around: 'The nature of the nominating procedure determines the nature of the party; he who can make the nominations is the owner of the party'. A third view is represented by Rahat and Hazan (2001: 298), who claim that candidate selection method both reflects the nature of the parties and affects party politics. No matter what the direction of the relationship

is, we can expect that there is a clear relationship between ‘the nature’ of parties and the candidate selection method.

Parties with ‘explicit ideologies and bureaucratised organisations’ are expected to select their candidates in backrooms rather than by open procedures (Seligman 1967: 312 quoted in Gallagher 1988a: 11). If the nature of a party affects the nature of its candidate selection method, dominant parties could be expected to be more exclusive in their selection of candidates than non-dominant parties. Dominant parties have uninterrupted control over the state for a long time, they win the presidency and the government and can dictate the political agenda (Pempel 1990: 1; Ware 1996: 159). Since their dominance is a central party characteristic, it is likely that the party leadership will control the selection of presidential candidates. An additional explanation for expecting dominant parties to select their candidates by more exclusive methods than non-dominant parties is provided by Lundell (2004: 33). He argues that where there is hard competition for power positions, parties will pay more attention to local branches and select their candidates with more inclusive selectorates to boost the legitimacy of its candidate. Conversely, where power positions are perceived as stable, as in dominant party systems, the national party organisation will have less to gain by introducing inclusive methods of candidate selection. The party leadership is likely to see their candidate as a certain winner in the presidential elections even without broad participation in the selection process. A dominant party is measured as a party that wins the presidency and an absolute majority in the lower chamber in at least three consecutive elections (Bogaards 2004; Sartori 1974: 195). Candidates selected to represent a dominant party are coded 1, otherwise 0.

The *age of the candidate’s party* is seen as an important determinant of candidate selection (Gallagher1988b: 263; Hazan 2002; Rahat and Hazan 2001). Lundell (2004) argues that the age of a party affects the degree of inclusiveness of candidate selection. On the one hand, younger parties can be hypothesised to respect internal democracy to a greater degree than older parties and therefore select their presidential candidates through more inclusive selection processes. With time, the leadership becomes professionalised and thereby more powerful. As a result, selection of candidates will become a matter for the party elite. Conversely, Ware (1996) uses lack of experience as an explanation for the degree of centralisation in the Greek Pasok party. Old parties have a more solid support base than younger parties, and may therefore be less afraid of opening up the candidate selection process without losing control over the party. To test these competing hypotheses, the age of a candidate’s party is included in the following analysis. I have tried to determine the founding data for the parties of the top two candidates. Party age is measured as the number of years

elapsed between the founding of the party and the year of the election where the candidate is selected to participate.⁹

Gallagher (1988b: 263) and Lundell both hypothesise that the *size of parties* affect the method of candidate selection. Lundell (2004: 32) assumes that small parties use more inclusive methods of candidate selection than bigger parties 'because the appeal of a small party is so limited that it has to rely on the drawing power of local notables.' On the other hand, it is more likely that small parties are more easily controlled from the top and that the presidential candidacy 'belongs' to the party leader. I therefore hypothesise that selection is likely to be a leadership matter in small parties, rather than the result of an inclusive and open process. The size of a party could be measured as the percentage of votes won by the candidate's party or electoral coalition in the previous presidential election (Carey and Polga-Hecimovich 2004). However, since the hypotheses regarding party size differentiate between big and small parties, a dummy is created where candidates representing a party that received at least 30% of the votes in the previous presidential election are coded one. Candidates representing parties that obtained less than 30% of the votes in the previous election are coded zero.¹⁰

If the nature of the party matters for how candidate are selected, the *nature of the party system* should similarly be related to the way presidential candidates are selected. The degree of party system institutionalisation should therefore affect candidate selection. Weakly institutionalised party systems are defined by weak party organisations, high electoral volatility, parties' shallow roots in society and politics dominated by individuals (Mainwaring and Scully 1997: 20). In weakly institutionalised party systems, parties are not key actors that structure the political process and there is greater space for populism and personalism (Mainwaring and Scully 1997: 22). Personalistic politicians are usually undisputed leaders of their parties (or electoral vehicles), and all important decisions are taken by the party leader. The presidential candidacy of such personalistic parties typically 'belongs' to the party leader as long as he or she is eligible. Since personalism is assumed to be stronger than party organisation in weakly institutionalised party systems, we should expect candidates in inchoate party systems to be selected in elite arrangements more often than candidates in institutionalised party systems.

On the other hand, Mainwaring and Scully (1995: 23) argue that there is a link between inchoate party systems and inclusiveness in candidate selection, and conversely, that in

⁹ For Latin American parties I rely primarily on data from Mainwaring and Scully (1995) and the Political Database of the Americas (www.georgetown.edu/pdba). For African parties, Kuenzi and Lambright (2001) and country specific literature has provided me with the information needed, and for Asian parties Nohlen et al. (2001), parties' internet sites, news reports and country specific literature were the basis for my classification of parties' age.

¹⁰ I also ran a regression analysis where party size was not dichotomised but treated as a continuous variable. This variable had a weak effect on the inclusiveness of candidate selection (0.005) but significant at the 0.5 level.

institutionalised party systems parties are more likely to control selection of presidential candidates: 'Where more institutionalized party systems exist, the parties usually control candidate selection for the head of government: the United States is the major exception.' This assumption echoes the traditional argument against primaries: that they tend to weaken party organisations, discourage the use of party labels and give space to independents and outsiders who are not loyal to party organisations but to the voters (Rahat and Hazan 2001: 313). If inclusive selection methods tend to weaken party organisations, we should expect inchoate party systems to be positively related to inclusiveness of candidate selection. If, on the other hand, inchoate party systems are dominated by personalistic leaders, inchoate party systems should have a negative effect on the inclusiveness of presidential candidate selection.

Mainwaring and Scully (1995) have developed a way to measure of party system institutionalisation according to three criteria: (1) regularity of party competition; (2) the extent to which parties manifest roots in society; and (3) the extent to which citizens and organized interests perceive that parties and elections are the means of determining who governs (see Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Kuenzi and Lambright 2001; Payne et al. 2002). I will here rely on Payne and colleagues' (2002) update and extension of Mainwaring and Scully's classification for party system institutionalisation in Latin America and on Kuenzi and Lambright (2001) for African countries. For presidential systems in Asia, I have calculated scores on party system institutionalisation. Even if institutionalisation is a continuum rather than a dichotomous variable, I will treat party systems as either (relatively) institutionalised (0) or inchoate (1) according to the criteria above. This is done primarily because the literature tends to dichotomise party system institutionalisation and since I want to test whether there is in fact a great difference in the way institutionalised and inchoate systems affect selection of presidential candidates.

Lastly, *incumbency* is likely to affect the inclusiveness of candidate selection. In their analysis of selection of gubernatorial candidates in Argentina, De Luca et al (2002) find that the eligibility of incumbents to run for re-election affects the decision to employ primaries. If re-election is allowed, an incumbent president is normally given as candidate in the upcoming election (Jones 2004). Just by being incumbents, they are usually perceived as being potential winners. Since the presidency is the most important political office in presidential systems, and incumbent presidents are usually automatically frontrunners, the party elite is likely to want to re-select an incumbent and thereby show off a united party in order to discourage the opposition. The internal challengers to the party's presidential candidacy will take the small chances for success into account, and usually refrain from challenging the candidacy of an incumbent. They will instead wait until there is an open candidacy to compete for. The decision to allow an incumbent to stand for re-election is therefore mostly a rubber stamp decision. We should therefore expect incumbents to be selected more often by exclusive

rather than inclusive methods. Incumbent presidents seeking re-election are coded 1 and while all other candidates are coded 0.

In summary, I consider ten hypotheses from the previous discussion on determinants of candidate selection methods – some of them competing:

H₁: Candidates selected in federal systems are more likely to be selected by inclusive methods of selection.

H₂: Candidates are more likely to be selected in inclusive processes when democratic rules and procedures are institutionalised.

H₃: All else equal, candidates are more likely to be selected in inclusive processes in Latin America compared to Africa and Asia because of regional contagion effects.

H₄: Dominant parties are more likely to select their presidential candidates by exclusive methods than non-dominant parties.

H₅: Younger parties respect internal democracy to a greater degree than older parties and are more likely to select their presidential candidates through more inclusive selection processes.

H₆: Compared to young parties, older parties have a more solid support base and are less afraid of losing control over the party by making selection processes more inclusive. They are therefore more likely to select their presidential candidates with more inclusive methods than young parties.

H₇: Small parties are more easily controlled from the top and selection of presidential candidates is more likely to be a leadership matter than in big parties.

H₈: If inclusive selection methods tend to weaken party organisations, candidates selected in weakly institutionalised party systems are more likely to be selected by inclusive methods than by exclusive methods of selection.

H₉: Candidates in inchoate party systems are likely to be selected in elite arrangements more often than candidates running for election in institutionalised party systems.

H₁₀: Incumbents are more likely to be selected by the party elite than non-incumbents.

To determine why presidential candidate selection varies over time, across regions, and between parties, I incorporate ten independent variables in the analysis of determinants of presidential candidate selection: Federalism, years since transition, Freedom House score, Africa, Asia, dominant party, party age, party size, party system institutionalisation, and incumbency.

Analysis and Results

The unit of analysis in this study of presidential candidate selection is the single candidate in a particular country at a specific time. Due to lacking data for five candidates, the number of cases included in the quantitative analysis is 323.

The dependent variable, presidential candidate selection, is given values from one to four ranging from the least inclusive to the most inclusive method of candidate selection. Selection by party leadership (or self-selection) is coded one, party conventions coded two, closed primaries three, and open primaries are given the value four.

In table 1 the effects of the independent variables on selection method and the correlations between the independent variables are reported. Except for federalism, all the independent variables have significant effects on the inclusiveness of candidate selection. The table also reveals that the correlations between the various independent variables are not as strong as to create multicollinearity. The strongest correlations are found between an inchoate party system and party age (-0.44), and Africa and the level of democracy (0.47). The correlation between party system institutionalisation and party age is self-evident since one of the defining characteristics of an inchoate party system is the low age of parties. Similarly, the strong correlation between Africa and Freedom House comes as no surprise: African democracy is much less stable and institutionalised than in presidential systems in Latin America and Asia.

Since the dependent variable is not continuous and the distribution is skewed (as evidenced in figure 2 earlier), an ordinary regression model is not ideal to determine what affects candidate selection. However, the arithmetical average is close to the centre of the scale, at 1.85 (table 2) and not so skewed as to make the estimates biased. I will employ an ordinary regression model even if it is not the ideal method in this case.¹¹

¹¹ The same model has been tested using multinomial regression. The results in terms of level of significance were identical to the OLS regression reported here, except for open primaries where there were no significant results.

Table 1 Correlations

	Selection method	Federalism	Years since transition	Freedom House Score	Africa	Asia	Dominant party	Age of party	Party size	Party system inchoate
Federalism	0.073									
Years since transition	0.223**	0.098								
Freedom House Score	-0.367**	-0.060	-0.287**							
Africa	-0.420**	-0.194**	-0.364**	0.468**						
Asia	-0.202**	-0.115*	0.157*	-0.118*	-0.221**					
Dominant party	-0.173**	-0.060	-0.101	0.223**	0.278**	0.009	0.038			
Age of party	0.520**	-0.020	0.083	-0.154**	-0.353**	-0.117*	0.253**	0.383**		
Party size	0.267**	-0.008	0.185*	-0.146*	-0.012	-0.035	0.287**	-0.438**	-0.378**	
Inchoate party system	-0.348**	0.013	-0.199**	0.183**	0.163**	0.045	0.413**	-0.134*	0.261**	0.030
Incumbency	-0.301**	-0.075	-0.115*	0.247**	0.383**	0.000				

Note: Correlations are Spearman's Rho except for Years since transition and Age of party where Pearson's r is reported.

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Table 2 Descriptive statistics

Variables	Mean	SD	N
Selection method	1.85	0.962	323
Federalism	0.12	0.330	323
Years since transition	12.31	12.902	323
Freedom House Score	2.975	1.123	323
Africa	0.34	0.474	323
Asia	0.09	0.282	323
Dominant party	0.10	0.295	323
Age of party	36.21	42.457	323
Party size	0.59	0.492	280
Inchoate party system	0.44	0.497	323
Incumbency	0.18	0.382	323

Table 3 Determinants of presidential candidate selection. OLS regression.

Independent variables	Model 1	Model 2
Federalism	-0.014 (0.127)	—
Years since transition	0.005 (0.003)	—
Freedom House score	-0.153*** (0.042)	-0.148*** (0.047)
Africa	-0.243** (0.120)	-0.361*** (0.127)
Asia	-0.660*** (0.154)	-0.664*** (0.158)
Dominant party	-0.396** (0.163)	-0.553*** (0.178)
Age of party	0.007*** (0.001)	0.007*** (0.001)
Party size	—	0.268** (0.110)
Inchoate party system	-0.367*** (0.099)	-0.373*** (0.107)
Incumbent	-0.229* (0.122)	-0.222 (0.142)
Constant	2.353*** (0.158)	2.342*** (0.162)
Adjusted R squared	0.441	0.475
Standard error of the estimate	0.719	0.726
Number of cases	323	280

Note: * Significant at the 0.10 level, ** Significant at the 0.05 level, *** Significant at the 0.01 level
Standard errors in parentheses.

Because the dependent variable can only take four values, the interpretation of the estimates are not as straightforward as is normally the case with ordinary regression analysis. Going from one to two or two to three or three to four on the dependent variable, each involves a step towards more inclusive candidate selection. The estimates can be therefore be understood as steps along the inclusiveness scale, indicating whether we can expect more or less inclusive candidate selection with a one unit's change in the independent variable. If the effect of an independent variable on the dependent is 0.5, we can typically expect a one unit's change in the independent variable to involve half a step's change towards more inclusiveness in candidate selection.

Table 3 reports two regression models. Model 1 tests Gallagher's hypotheses except for *party size* which is included in model 2. Model 2 analyses a restricted sample where all first elections are excluded since party size is zero in all first elections. Four main conclusions can be drawn from the model 1 analysis.

First of all, contrary to Gallagher's expectations in H_1 , whether a state is federal or unitary does not significantly affect the way presidential candidates are selected. This null finding may be due to the national importance of presidential candidate selection, which is great no matter what the government structure of the country is like.

Second, cultural variables are important for the degree of inclusiveness in candidate selection. A democratic culture is important when explaining variation in candidate selection as expected in H_2 . On average, as the level of freedom is reduced and countries move up one point on the Freedom House scale, selection of presidential candidates is typically one sixths of a step lower on the inclusiveness scale than selection in more free countries.

However, H_2 saying that as democratic norms and procedures are institutionalised parties are more likely to select candidates with inclusive methods, is only partly supported. Rather surprisingly, the number of years since transition does not significantly affect whether presidential candidates are selected by exclusive or more inclusive methods. The greater inclusiveness of candidate selection in Latin America compared to Africa and Asia is not due to longer experience with democratic elections.

Part of the answer to the varying degree of inclusiveness in candidate selection, may nevertheless be found in cultural factors. As hypothesised in H_3 , the regression model suggests that the regional differences are important determinants for candidate selection. When controlling for party system characteristics, age of party, years since transition, level of democracy, and government structure, region is the most important determinant for presidential candidate selection. Both African and Asian presidential candidates are typically selected by more exclusive methods than their Latin American colleagues. Selection of

African presidential candidates is on average one-fourths of a step lower on the selection scale, while selection of Asian candidates is typically two-thirds of a step lower on the dependent variable than is selection of Latin American candidates. That region shows so strong effect on candidate selection suggests that political culture and imitation are strong determinants for how parties choose to select their presidential candidates.

Third, party and party system variables all strongly affect candidate selection. As expected in H₄, dominant party has a strong inverse effect on the inclusiveness of presidential candidate selection. Generally, candidates from dominant parties are much less likely to be selected by inclusive selectorates than candidates from non-dominant parties. When other independent variables are controlled for, the selection of presidential candidates in dominant parties is on average two-fifths of a step lower on the inclusiveness scale than selection in non-dominant parties.

The age of party has a significant positive effect on inclusiveness of candidate selection. Consequently, H₅ is not supported with evidence from mainly third wave democracies while Ware's hypothesis (H₆) that parties grow more confident with age as their voter base stabilises, appears to be supported. As parties grow older they tend to use more inclusive methods of candidate selection than younger parties.¹² The analysis suggests that selection of candidates in parties that have existed for 100 years, as the Colombian Partido Liberal (PL) and Partido Nacional (PN) or Honduras PL and PN, is in general two-thirds of a step higher on the inclusiveness scale compared to candidate selection in parties that are just founded.

Whether candidates operate within inchoate or institutionalised party systems has a significant inverse effect on the inclusiveness of presidential candidate selection. As predicted by H₉ but contrary to H₈, compared to selection of candidates in institutionalised party systems, presidential candidates in inchoate party systems tend to be selected with more exclusive methods. Going from institutionalised to inchoate party systems, the degree of inclusiveness in candidate selection is typically reduced by two-fifths of a step. Consequently, the general scholarly scepticism towards inclusive methods of candidate selection for weakening party organisations and the party system does not seem to be substantiated.

Lastly, as hypothesized in H₁₀, incumbency has a significant inverse effect on the inclusiveness of candidate selection. Incumbent presidents are significantly less likely to be selected by inclusive methods than non-incumbents. Compared to selection of non-

¹² I also ran a regression analysis not reported here where party age was dichotomised. Parties 20 years or older were given the value 1, and parties younger than 20 years were coded 0. The variable had a strong significant effect on inclusiveness of candidate selection (0.300) suggesting that although one year of difference in party age does not have a great effect on inclusiveness of candidate selection, parties founded twenty years ago or more tend to select their presidential candidates by more inclusive methods than do younger parties.

incumbents, selection of candidates who are incumbents is on average one-fifths of a step lower on the inclusiveness scale.

Model 2 includes party size and therefore excludes all first elections after transition. 43 of the candidates in my selection were selected to run in first elections and the number of observations consequently drops from 323 to 280. Federalism and years since transition are excluded from this analysis as they did not have significant effects on candidate selection in model 1.

First, it can be noted that party size has a significant and positive effect on inclusiveness of candidate selection, as hypothesised in H₇. Selection of candidates in parties that received 30% of the vote or more in the last presidential elections is on average more than one-fourths step higher on the inclusiveness scale compared to selection in smaller parties. In other words, parties that did well in the last presidential elections are more likely to select their presidential candidate by inclusive methods than parties who did not exist or performed poorly in the last elections. Since party size can be seen as an indicator of the vulnerability of the candidate, it seems that parties feeling vulnerable have a greater need to control the candidate selection than parties confident of their strength and of their potential of being serious contenders. This result is the reverse of what Lundell (2004) finds for selection of legislative candidates in 'advanced democracies in the developed world'. In his dataset, big parties use more exclusive methods of candidate selection than smaller parties. The difference between Lundell's findings and mine may be due to differences between presidential and parliamentary candidate selection already commented. It may also be due to diverging party characteristics and political culture between Western Europe on the one hand and new and partly unstable presidential systems in the developing world on the other.

The principal variable effects from model 1 are found also when party size is controlled for. Dominant party still has the strongest effect on candidate selection together with the regional dummy for Asia. We can typically expect selection of presidential candidates in dominant parties to be more than half a step lower on the inclusiveness scale than selection in non-dominant parties. The hypothesis that the nature of parties is of great significance for how candidates are selected is thereby further supported. The cultural hypotheses are also further strengthened.

One main difference should nevertheless be commented. Incumbency no longer has a significant impact on the degree of inclusiveness. It seems that it is the strength of the incumbent's vote in the previous election, rather than incumbency per se that affects the level of inclusiveness in candidate selection. Strong parties are confident of their winning potential and might think they have less to fear by selecting their candidates in open competition than weaker parties who fear losing and hence try to show off a united party.

In conclusion, the trend towards ‘democratisation’ of presidential candidate selection over time is primarily due to party system institutionalisation, the lack of a dominant party, relatively strong (big) parties, a developed democratic culture, and to the inclusiveness in selection of Latin American candidates. The analysis confirms the common assertion that the choice of selection methods reflects a party’s strength and position and the nature of the party system. The strong effects of region on candidate selection nonetheless underline that there are still important determinants of presidential candidate selection that have not yet been identified – unless we say that the nuts and bolts of politics are generically different in different regions.

Conclusion

In this article I have discussed selection of presidential candidates in relation to the degree of openness and inclusiveness of candidacy and selectorates. How candidates are selected was expected to affect their legitimacy as candidates: candidates nominated in systems with little restrictions on candidacy and candidates selected in open competition with other candidates were hypothesised to be more representative and legitimate than others. The analysis of data revealed that presidential candidate selection has become more inclusive during the past thirty years, in all three regions under study. The ‘democratisation’ of presidential selection is something of a puzzle since the nature of presidential elections leads us to expect presidential elections to be centralised and closely controlled by the party leadership. The increased inclusiveness is however, most articulated in Latin America. Here, primaries have become the most regularly used method of selecting presidential candidates. In Africa and Asia, primaries have so far only been used a handful of times.

The determinants of presidential candidate selections are diverse. The most important reasons why parties select their candidates openly rather than in smoke filled back rooms are an institutionalised party system, a ban on re-election, strong electoral performance in previous election, and being a Latin American party. The most important factors contributing to keeping candidate selection a back room matter in many parties, is a dominant party, a weak electoral performance, a weak party system – and region. African and Asian parties are considerably less likely to select presidential candidates in open processes than Latin American parties, even when controlling for the party nature, the party system and the level of democracy. I started out saying that we know surprisingly little about presidential candidate selection and its determinants. We now know a little more, but further research on the determinants of presidential candidate selection worldwide is clearly needed.

References

- Bille, Lars (2001): 'Democratizing a Democratic Procedure: Myth or Reality? Candidate Selection in Western European Parties, 1960-90.' *Party Politics* 7: 363-80
- Bogaards, Matthijs (2004): 'Counting parties and identifying dominant party systems in Africa.' *European Journal of Political Research* 43: 173-97
- Canon, David T. (1990): *Actors, Athletes, and Astronauts: Political Amateurs in the United States Congress*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Carey, John M. and Matthew S. Shugart (1995): 'Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: A Rank-Ordering of Electoral Formulas' *Electoral Studies* 14: 417-439.
- Carey, John M. and John Polga-Hecimovich (2004): 'Primary elections and candidate strength in Latin America.' Paper available at http://www.dartmouth.edu/~jcarey/C&PH_august_2004.pdf
- Colomer, Josep (2003): 'Las elecciones primarias presidenciales en América Latina y sus consecuencias políticas.' In Marcelo Cavarozzi and Juan Manuel Abal Medina (eds.): *Los partidos latinoamericanos en la era neoliberal*. Buenos Aires: Altamira/Konrad Adenauer.
- De Luca, Miguel, Mark P. Jones and María Inés Tula (2002): 'Back Rooms or Ballot Boxes? Candidate Nomination in Argentina' *Comparative Political Studies* 35: 413-36.
- Epstein, Leon D. (1967): *Political Parties in Western Democracies*. New York: Praeger.
- Freidenberg, Flavia and Francisco Sánchez López (2002): '¿Cómo se elige un candidato a presidente? Reglas y prácticas en los partidos políticos de América Latina', *Revista de Estudios Políticos* 118: 321-62.
- Gallagher, Michael (1988a): 'Introduction' pp. 1-19 in Michael Gallagher and Michael Marsh (eds.): *Candidate Selection in Comparative Perspective: The Secret Garden of Politics*. London: Sage.
- Gallagher, Michael (1988b): 'Conclusion' pp. 236-83 in Michael Gallagher and Michael Marsh (eds.): *Candidate Selection in Comparative Perspective: The Secret Garden of Politics*. London: Sage.
- Gallagher, Michael and Michael Marsh (eds.) (1988): *Candidate Selection in Comparative Perspective: The Secret Garden of Politics* London: Sage.
- Gerber, Elisabeth R. and Rebecca B. Morton (1998): 'Primary Election Systems and Representation' *Journal of Law, Economics and Organization* 14: 304-24.
- Gjerde, Camilla (2005): 'Political Institutions and Extreme Presidents. Comparing presidential systems in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, 1974-2004.' PhD dissertation. Oslo: University of Oslo.
- Hazan, Reuven Y. (2002): 'Candidate Selection' pp. 108-26 in Lawrence LeDuc, Richard G Niemi, and Pippa Norris (eds.): *Comparing democracies 2*. London: Sage.
- Kuenzi, Michelle and Gina Lambright (2001): 'Party System Institutionalization in 30 African Countries' *Party Politics* 7: 437-68.
- LeDuc, Lawrence (2001): 'Democratizing Party Leadership selection', *Party Politics* 7: 323-41.
- Levitsky, Steven and Lucan A. Way (2002): 'The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism', *Journal of Democracy* 13 (2): 51-65.
- Lundell, Krister (2004): 'Determinants of Candidate Selection: The Degree of Centralization in Comparative Perspective' *Party Politics* 10: 25-47.
- Mainwaring, Scott and Timothy Scully (1995): 'Introduction' in Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully (eds.): *Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Mainwaring, Scott and Matthew S. Shugart (1997): 'Conclusion' in Scott Mainwaring and Matthew S. Shugart (eds.) *Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Norris, Pippa (1996): 'Legislative Recruitment' pp. 184-215 in Lawrence LeDuc, Richard G Niemi, and Pippa Norris (eds.): *Comparing democracies*. London: Sage.
- Payne, J. M., D. Zovatto G., F. Carrillo Flores and A. Alamand Zavala (2002): *Democracies in Development: Politics and Reform in Latin America*. Stockholm: IDEA.
- Pempel, T.J. (1990): 'Introduction' in T.J. Pempel (ed.): *Uncommon Democracies: The one-party dominant regimes*. New York: Cornell University Press.
- Pennings, Paul and Reuven Y. Hazan (2001): 'Democratizing Candidate Selection: Causes and Consequences.' *Party Politics* 7: 267-76.
- Przeworski, Adam, Michael E. Alvarez, José A. Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi (2000): *Democracy and Development: Political institutions and well-being in the world, 1950-1990*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Rahat, Gideon and Reuven Y. Hazan (2001): 'Candidate Selection Methods: An Analytical Framework' *Party Politics* 7: 297-322
- Ranney, Austin (1981): 'Candidate Selection' pp. 75-106 in David Butler, Howard R. Penniman, and Austin Ranney: *Democracy at the Polls: A Comparative Study of Competitive National Elections*. Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.
- Sartori, Giovanni (1976): *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Schattschneider, E.E. (1942): *Party Government*. New York: Farrar and Rinehart.
- Sherbourne, Robin (2004): 'After the Dust Has Settled: Continuity or Stagnation?' IPPR Opinion No.16. Windhoek: IPPR. (<http://www.ippr.org.na/publications.htm>)
- Shugart, Matthew S. (2001): "'Extreme" Electoral Systems and the Appeal of the Mixed-Member Alternative' pp. 25-51 in Shugart and Wattenberg (eds.): *Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: The Best of Both Worlds?* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Ware, Alan (1996): *Political Parties and Party Systems*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Wu, Chung-Li (2001): 'The Transformation of the Kuomintang's Candidate Selection System' *Party Politics* 7: 103-18.